



FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY – HOW TO VALIDATE SECURITY MODELS


September 30, 2024 • Rita L. Griffith, CISA, CFE • Alex Martirosyan, OSEP, CRTO, OSCP, GPEN

INTRODUCTION



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AGENDA

- ▀ What is a Model?
- ▀ Differentiating Between Models vs. Tools
- ▀ "What Systems are Models?"
- ▀ Supervisory Guidance
- ▀ Sample Validation Process
- ▀ Threat Emulation Concepts
- ▀ Demonstration of Validation Process Steps
- ▀ A Little About Us



WHAT IS A MODEL?

WHAT IS A MODEL?

▀ As defined by SR11-7: Guidance on Model Risk Management:

A quantitative method, system, or approach that applies statistical, economic, financial, or mathematical theories, techniques, and assumptions to process input data into quantitative estimates.

MODEL TEST



Component Test

- Information input component
- Processing component
- Reporting component



Estimate Test

- Quantitative estimates
- Transforms inputs into outputs of a different type
- Apply statistical, economic, financial, behavioral or mathematical theories or techniques



Relationship Test

- A simplified representation of real-world relationships



Subjectivity Test

- Subjective judgment exercised at various stages of model development, implementation, use and validation



Use Test

- Supports decision making and to provide predictive information in a number of business areas

WHAT IS A TOOL?

A computational process as opposed to a quantitative system. It applies simple arithmetic calculations not expected to produce ambiguous values regardless of the complexity of the computation. A tool performs simple calculations, compiles financial information, reports results but not predictive in nature.



SYSTEMS AS MODELS


SYSTEMS AS MODELS

Mathematical

Machine Learning

Statistical

Simulation



WHAT IS MODEL RISK?

WHAT IS MODEL RISK?

- The potential for adverse consequences from decisions based on incorrect or misused model outputs and reports.
- Can lead to:
 - Financial Loss
 - Poor business and strategic decision making
 - Damage to an Institution's Reputation





REGULATORY GUIDANCE

REGULATIONS RELATING TO MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT

May 2000:
OCC 2000-16
Risk Modeling:
Model
Validation



November
2013: FHFA
Releases AB
2013-07
Model Risk
Management
Guidance



June 2017:
FDIC adoption
of SR11-7



August 2021:
OCC issues
Comptroller's
Handbook on
Model risk
Management



April 2011:
FED SR 11-
7/OCC Bulletin
2011-12
"Supervisory
Guidance on
Model Risk
Management"



January 2016:
ECB
establishes
Targeted
Review of
Internal
Models (TRIM)



December
2017: UK PRA
"Model Risk
Management
Principles for
Stress Testing"




December
2022: FHFA
Issues
Supplemental
Guidance to
Model Risk
Management
Guidance





COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT

COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT





WHAT IS A MODEL VALIDATION?


WHAT IS A MODEL VALIDATION?

A set of processes and activities intended to verify that the models are performing as expected and are in line with their design objectives and business uses.



SAMPLE VALIDATION PROCESS

SAMPLE VALIDATION PROCESS





THREAT EMULATION TO VALIDATE MODELS

CYBERSECURITY TESTING & RESPONSE MATURITY



**VULNERABILITY
MANAGEMENT**



**PENETRATION
TESTING**



**PURPLE
TEAM**




RED TEAM





BLUE TEAM


COMMON SECURITY TESTING MODEL











Security Testing Model

THREAT EMULATION



- ▀ Gather Cyber Threat Intelligence
 - Verizon DBIR, US-CERT alerts, etc.
- ▀ Identify Procedures to Emulate
- ▀ Identify Metrics
 - Data Sources, Detections, Response times
- ▀ Execution
 - May start with Tabletop Exercise (TTX)
- ▀ Lessons Learned
 - Critical to feed into the next cycle of testing

MITRE ATT&CK®

- ▀ Tracks threat actors through observable data
- ▀ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
- ▀ Post compromise focus




MITRE ATT&CK® MATRICES

MATRIX	ENTERPRISE	MOBILE	INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ISC)
Platforms:	Windows macOS Linux PRE Azure AD Office 365 Google Workspace SaaS IaaS Network Containers	Android iOS	ICS networks
Tactics:	14	14	12
Techniques:	379	92	78

HOW MITRE ATT&CK® CAN BE USED

Outputs

- ▀ Threat model(s) of adversary tactics and techniques
- ▀ Mitigation and detection capabilities in place
- ▀ Testing plan to validate controls
- ▀ Remediation plans
- ▀ Board & Executive roadmap



USE ATT&CK FOR CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command & Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Valid Accounts		Scheduled Task/Job	Valid Accounts	Modify Authentication Process	System Service Discovery	Remote Services	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Destruction
Replication Through Removable Media	Windows Management Instrumentation		Hijack Execution Flow		OS Credential Dumping	Network Sniffing	Application Window Discovery	Data from Removable Media	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Trusted Relationship	Software Deployment Tools	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts		Direct Volume Access	Input Capture	System Network Configuration Discovery	System Network Discovery	Input Capture	Application Layer Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Shared Modules	Create or Modify System Process		Rootkit	Brute Force	System Owner/User Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery	Data Staged	Proxy	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Shared Modules	Event Triggered Execution		Obfuscated Files or Information	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Owner/User Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery	Screen Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Firmware Corruption
Exploit Public-Facing Application	User Execution	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution				System Owner/User Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery	Email Collection	Web Service	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Resource Hijacking
Phishing	Exploitation for Client Execution	Account Manipulation	Process Injection		Exploitation for Credential Access	System Network Connections Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery	Clipboard Data	Multi-Stage Channels	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Network Denial of Service
External Remote Services	System Services	External Remote Services	Access Token Manipulation		Steal Web Session Cookie	System Network Connections Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery	Automated Collection	Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Endpoint Denial of Service
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Office Application Startup	Group Policy Modification		Steal Web Session Cookie	System Network Connections Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery	Audio Capture	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Web Service	System Shutdown/Reboot
	Browser Extensions	Create Account	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Unsecured Credentials		Permission Groups Discovery	Permission Groups Discovery	Video Capture	Traffic Signaling	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal
	Native API	Traffic Signaling	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Indicator Removal on Host	Credentials from Password Stores	File and Directory Discovery	File and Directory Discovery	Man in the Browser	Remote Access Software	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk Wipe
	Inter-Process Communication	BITS Jobs		Modify Registry	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Peripheral Device Discovery	Peripheral Device Discovery	Data from Information Repositories	Dynamic Resolution		Data Manipulation
		Server Software Component		Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets			Man-in-the-Middle	Non-Standard Port		
		Pre-OS Boot		Traffic Signaling	Forced Authentication			Archive Collected Data	Protocol Tunneling		
		Compromise Client Software Binary		Signed Script Proxy Execution	Steal Application Access Token	Network Share Discovery	Network Share Discovery	Data from Network Shared Drive	Encrypted Channel		
		Implant Container Image		Rogue Domain Controller	Man-in-the-Middle	Password Policy Discovery	Password Policy Discovery	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				Indirect Command Execution		Browser Bookmark Discovery	Browser Bookmark Discovery				
				BITS Jobs		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion				
				XSL Script Processing		Cloud Service Dashboard	Cloud Service Dashboard				
				Template Injection		Software Discovery	Software Discovery				
				File and Directory Permissions Modification		Query Registry	Query Registry				
				Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion		Remote System Discovery	Remote System Discovery				
				Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions		Network Service Scanning	Network Service Scanning				
				Use Alternate Authentication Material		Process Discovery	Process Discovery				
				Impair Defenses		System Information Discovery	System Information Discovery				
				Hide Artifacts		Account Discovery	Account Discovery				
				Masquerading		System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery				
				Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information		Domain Trust Discovery	Domain Trust Discovery				
				Signed Binary Proxy Execution		Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery				
				Exploitation for Defense Evasion							
				Execution Guardrails							
				Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure							
				Pre-OS Boot							
				Subvert Trust Controls							

LEGEND

- APT28
- APT29
- Both

USE ATT&CK TO BUILD YOUR DEFENSIVE PLATFORM


Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command & Control	Exfiltration	Impact	
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		Traffic Signaling		Modify Registry		Cloud Service Dashboard			Data from Information Repositories	Dynamic Resolution	Data Manipulation	Data Manipulation
		BITS Jobs		Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution		Software Discovery			Archive Collected Data	Non-Standard Port		
		Server Software Component		Traffic Signaling		Query Registry			Data from Network Shared Drive	Protocol Tunneling		
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LEGEND


	Low Priority
	High Priority

Finding Gaps in Defense

KEEP YOUR THREAT MODELS UP TO DATE




BREAKING THE CHAIN



Source: <https://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html>


DEFENSIVE REALITY

- Detecting offensive outcomes is different for every procedure
- Offense has the luxury of a one-to-many mapping
- How many ways to perform Kerberoasting
 - PowerShell, C#, Mimikatz, etc.



Offensive Outcome One-to-Many



BREAKING THE CHAIN



Source: <https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/summitting-the-pyramid-level-up-your-analytics-b6f12efd9133>


THREAT EMULATION MAKE A PLAN

- Plan for the long-term success
- Iteration is key – get processes in place before looking to smash a home run
- PTES outlines procedural support for this program
 - Start with a TTX to introduce terms and approach



<https://github.com/scythe-io/purple-team-exercise-framework>

THREAT EMULATION – REMEDIATION



REMEDIATION – PASSWORD SPRAY

Brute Force: Password Spraying


Other sub-techniques of Brute Force (4) ^	
ID	Name
T1110.001	Password Guessing
T1110.002	Password Cracking
T1110.003	Password Spraying
T1110.004	Credential Stuffing

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

[1]


D3FEND Inferred Relationships

Browse the D3FEND knowledge graph by clicking on the nodes below.



REMEDIATION – PASSWORD SPRAY

- Review available mitigations with efficiency in mind
- ATT&CK Navigator layers available for visual aids



Related ATT&CK Techniques:

These mappings are inferred, experimental, and will improve as the knowledge graph grows.

These offensive techniques are determined related because of the way this defensive technique.

d3f.One-timePassword, authenticates User Account, and use-limits Password.

Credential Access	Defense Evasion	Impact	Initial Access	Persistence	Privilege Escalation
Brute Force	Valid Accounts	Account Access Removal	Defense Evasion Technique	Defense Evasion Technique	Defense Evasion Technique
Password Guessing	Default Accounts		Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts
Password Cracking	Domain Accounts		Valid Accounts	Initial Access Technique	Initial Access Technique
Password Spraying	Local Accounts		Default Accounts	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts
	Cloud Accounts		Domain Accounts	Default Accounts	Persistence Technique
	Initial Access Technique		Local Accounts	Domain Accounts	Valid Accounts
	Valid Accounts		Cloud Accounts	Local Accounts	Create Account
	Persistence Technique		Persistence Technique	Cloud Accounts	Valid Accounts
	Valid Accounts		Valid Accounts	Account Manipulation	Default Accounts
	Privilege Escalation Technique		Privilege Escalation Technique	Exchange Email Delegate Permissions	Domain Accounts
	Valid Accounts		Valid Accounts	Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role	Local Accounts
				Create Account	Cloud Accounts
				Local Account	Create Account
				Domain Account	Local Account
				Cloud Account	Domain Account
				Privilege Escalation Technique	Cloud Account
				Valid Accounts	
				Create Account	



EXAMPLE EDR VALIDATION

ENDPOINT DETECTION & RESPONSE

While all operating system vendors work to continuously improve the security of their products, two stand out as being “secure by design,” specifically, Chromebooks and iOS devices like iPads.

Some organizations have migrated some or all their staff to use Chromebooks and iPads. As a result, they have removed a great deal of “attack surface,” which in turn makes it much harder for attackers to get a foothold. Even if an attacker were able to find a foothold on those systems as part of a ransomware attack, the data primarily lives in a secure cloud service, reducing the severity of the attack.

- ▀ <https://docs.preludesecurity.com/docs/endpoints>
- ▀ <https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-guidance-small-businesses>

DEFINING OBJECTIVES

- What is the EDR used for?
 - What is it NOT used for?
- What data types & sources feed into the EDR?
- What are the threats we're concerned about?
 - Ransomware, APT, etc.

GATHER AND PREPARE DATA

▀ Policies and Procedures

- Logging or Monitoring
- Incident Response
- SIEM related checklists/runbooks

▀ Configurations

- Log Sources
- Alerts
- Default Rules
- Custom Rules

▀ Adversary TTPs

- Identify overlap with expected controls
- Document expected outcomes

▀ Test Infrastructure Creation

- Tools
- Network Connections
- Execution method(s)

MAPPING EXAMPLE


Step	High Level Overview of Emulation and Techniques Evaluated	Cited Intelligence	Open Invitation Contributor(s)	Emulation Content
1	<p>The scenario begins with an initial breach, where a legitimate user clicks (T1204) an executable payload (screensaver executable) masquerading as a benign word document (T1036). Once executed, the payload creates a C2 connection over port 1234 (T1065) using the RC4 cryptographic cipher . The attacker then uses the active C2 connection to spawn interactive cmd.exe (T1059) and powershell.exe (T1086) shells.</p>	<p>CosmicDuke’s infection payloads have started by tricking victims into opening a Windows executable whose filename is manipulated to look like an image file using the Right-to-Left Override (RLO) feature. CosmicDuke has also used RC4 to decrypt incoming data and encrypt outgoing data.^[2]</p> <p>SeaDuke and CozyDuke have used the RC4 cipher to encrypt data.^{[4] [7] [13] [16]}</p> <p>CozyDuke can be used to spawn a command line shell. ^[16]</p>	Kaspersky	<p>The Day 1 README.md file describes how to either use the precompiled cod.3aka3.scr or generate a custom payload (via payload_configs.md), as well as additional commands to complete the step.</p>

APT29 / Cozy Bear / The Dukes Emulation Plan – MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations

<https://attacker.vals.mitre-engenuity.org/enterprise/participants/elastic>

MITRE ATT&CK® EVALUATIONS

- Open evaluations against vendors using the ATT&CK matrix
 - Incredibly powerful resources worth investigating
- Everyone is a winner?
- Our industry likes checklists and pretty colors



EVALUATE RESULTS

▀ Observability

- Did we capture a log?

▀ Detection

- Did we generate an alert?

▀ Mitigation

- Did we prevent or stop the action?

REFINE THE CONTROL

▀ Observability

- Did we capture a log?
 - Add logging source
 - Refine audit policies

▀ Detection


- Did we generate an alert?
 - Create new alert
 - Refine alert thresholds

▀ Mitigation

- Did we prevent or stop the action?
 - Can we prevent within acceptable F/P rates

REPEAT THE PROCESS

- Continue to refine the process based on your evolving threat model
- Use the process to “test” changes to controls
- Document results over time



ATR OVERVIEW

```
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/install-atomicredteam.ps1'); Install-AtomicRedTeam -getAtomics -Force
```

- ATR can be used test singular actions iteratively
- GOAL: Telemetry is most important

ATOMIC RED TEAM

Conti Discovery

```
ipconfig /all
systeminfo
whoami /groups
net config workstation
nltest /domain_trusts
nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
net view /all /domain
net view /all
new group "Domain Admins" /domain
```

<https://thefirreport.com/2021/05/12/conti-ransomware/>

- ▀ T1016
- ▀ T1082
- ▀ T1033
- ▀ T1482
- ▀ What else is missing?

DEMONSTRATION

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Invoke-AtomicTest T1082 -ShowDetails -TestNumbers 1
PathToAtomicsFolder = C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics



















WARNING: [C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1082\T1082.yaml][Atomic test name: List OS Information] The following input argument is defined
but not utilized: 'output_file'.
WARNING: [C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1082\T1082.yaml][Atomic test name: Griffon Recon] The following input argument is defined but not
utilized: 'vbscript'.
WARNING: [C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1082\T1082.yaml][Atomic test name: Azure Security Scan with SkyArk] The following input argument
is defined but not utilized: 'password'.
WARNING: [C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1082\T1082.yaml][Atomic test name: Azure Security Scan with SkyArk] The following input argument
is defined but not utilized: 'username'.
[*****BEGIN TEST*****]
Technique: System Information Discovery T1082
Atomic Test Name: System Information Discovery
Atomic Test Number: 1
Atomic Test GUID: 66703791-c902-4560-8770-42b8a91f7667umbers 1
Description: Identify System Info. Upon execution, system info and time info will be displayed.

Attack Commands:
Executor: command_prompt
ElevationRequired: False
Command:
systeminfo
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum
[!!!!!!!END TEST!!!!!!!]
```

DEMONSTRATION



MICRO EMULATION

Atomic Testing	Micro Emulation	Full Emulation
Emulate single technique	Emulate compound behaviors across 2–3 techniques	Emulate adversary operation
 Executable in seconds	 Executable in seconds	 Executable in hours
<i>E.g., Atomic Red test for T1003.001 - LSASS Memory</i>	<i>E.g., Fork & Run Process Injection</i>	<i>E.g., FIN6 adversary emulation plan</i>
 Easy to automate	 Easy to automate	 Easy to automate
 Validate atomic analytics	 Validate atomic analytics	 Validate atomic analytics
 Validate chain analytics	 Validate chain analytics	 Validate chain analytics
 Evaluate SOC against a specific set of TTPs	 Evaluate SOC against a specific set of TTPs	 Evaluate SOC against a specific set of TTPs
 Evaluate SOC holistically against specific groups	 Evaluate SOC holistically against specific groups	 Evaluate SOC holistically against specific groups

<https://mitre-engenuity.org/cybersecurity/center-for-threat-informed-defense/our-work/micro-emulation-plans/>

C2 – INCREASING ACCURACY

- A new trend may be seen from our understanding:
 - We are limited to singular processes / atomic actions
 - Element of realism may be missed due to our approach
 - We can scale / implement more resources to create an accurate plan

- Threat actors use a C2 and we can too (CALDERA)

QUESTIONS?



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WHO WE ARE

1911

**WOLF & CO.
ESTABLISHED**

375+

PROFESSIONALS



3 OFFICES IN:

- ☑ Boston, MA
- ☑ Springfield, MA
- ☑ Princeton, NJ



SERVICES OFFERED IN:

- ☑ Audit
- ☑ Tax
- ☑ Risk Management



2023
ANNUAL REPORT

2023: A YEAR OF RENEWED PURPOSE

We are Wolf & Company.

As we pave the way forward, take a look into the past year's milestones and see how we set the foundation to reach new heights in 2024 and beyond.



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ABOUT DENSECURE

Wolf & Company's IT Assurance & Advisory team of cybersecurity experts, DenSecure™, brings together extensive technical knowledge and industry experience with internationally-recognized frameworks to develop strong cybersecurity programs.

DenSecure's core services include:

- Advanced Security Assessment
- Application Penetration Testing
- Network Penetration Testing
- Social Engineering
- Threat Emulation

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